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ABSTRACT
Unsolicited ratings have long been overlooked in the investment
landscape and issuer pay models. Although Congress has lost its
confidence in the credit rating agencies’ reputation theory and is now
considering a semi-closed market as the only viable solution to the
conflict of interest problem, financial scholars have proposed the
Inequality model using unsolicited ratings and focusing on a
reputational theory that could lead to more stringent rating standards.
This Note argues that it is possible to achieve the Inequality for
unsolicited ratings by utilizing the already required disclosures and
making a few enhancements. This Note proposes that this will in
turn improve accuracy and combat the conflict of interest problem
without deviating from free market principles.
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INTRODUCTION
Four years after the 2008 financial crisis, the United States
economy is still recovering and fingers are being pointed at the credit
rating agencies (“CRAs”) and the issuer pay model for their role in the
economic collapse.1 Many question how CRAs can honestly evaluate
entities that are paying their bills.2 Congress and many academics have
rejected the long propounded reputation theory, which holds that the
mere threat of a loss of reputation curtails CRAs bad behavior, and
justifies little to no regulation within the industry.3 Yet, reversing the
current approach to an investor-pay model is also inadequate for the task
1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxv (2011),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_
full.pdf.
2. See Louise Story et al., Anger Over Credit Rating Resurfaces in Washington,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/
business/economy/standard-poors-downgrade-evokes-anger-in-washington.html?
pagewanted=all.
3. See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank
Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1305–06 (2011); Timothy E. Lynch,
Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory
Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 250–67 (2009); Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006).
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of evaluating the credit risk in the modern economy.4 Congress and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have attempted to fix
issuer pay problems through the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 (“CRARA” or “Credit Reform Act”)5 and Title IX of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) 6 by bringing CRAs within the SEC’s regulatory purview,
requiring extensive disclosures, and changing the hiring process for
ratings to an assignment system.7
Even prior to the investor-pay or issuer pay models, the very first
publication by Moody’s Investors Services (“Moody’s”) was a book of
unsolicited ratings prepared by Moody’s without compensation from
issuers, providing information on issuers for the marketplace. 8 The
practice of issuing unsolicited ratings has persisted under both models,9
but in the last fifteen years, unsolicited ratings have lost their popularity
and were not mentioned or used in either the CRARA or Dodd-Frank.
Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (“Fulghieri”) proposed a rational expectation
model to identify the circumstances in which unsolicited ratings would
lead to more stringent or less stringent ratings standards.10 In forming
this rational expectation model, Fulghieri and his colleagues considered
both the positive and negative incentives of CRAs, focusing on
reputational theory, and concluded that if the long-term reputational
costs of inaccurate rating are higher than the short-term gains (the
“Inequality” 11 ), CRAs will issue accurate ratings, including for
unsolicited ratings.12
This Note will argue that within the context of unsolicited ratings,
the rejected reputational theory will produce accurate and beneficial
4. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. Q. REV., Summer-Fall 1994, at 4, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/quarterly_review/1994v19/v19n2article1.pdf (discussing the rapid growth in
size and subject matter for CRAs after the switch to the issuer pay model which could
not have been possible under the investor pay model).
5. Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 (2010).
7. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the Dodd-Frank reforms.
8. Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Paolo Fulghieri, Gunter Strobl & Han Xia, The Economics of Solicited and
Unsolicited Credit Ratings (Am. Fin. Ass’n 2011 Denver Meetings, Working Paper,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572059
(producing a mathematical model rather than empirical testing).
11. Long term reputation cost > short term gains.
12. See id. at 26.
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ratings if the Inequality is achieved. This Note will employ the
principles expressed by the Inequality to examine the source of the
problems that have plagued the credit rating industry and those who rely
on it throughout the last decade.13 In addition, this Note will identify
ways that unsolicited ratings will help alleviate these issues, and
evaluate the extent to which new proposed reforms, including DoddFrank, succeed in minimizing the harmful effects of the short-term gains
CRAs derive from unsolicited ratings while maximizing the positive
influence of the long-term reputational costs CRAs suffer as a result of
inaccuracies in ratings.
Part I discusses the history of CRAs and the reputational difficulties
that plagued CRAs as a consequence of the Enron bankruptcy and the
2008 financial crisis. Part II considers how CRARA and Dodd-Frank
tried to solve these problems and explores unsolicited ratings in the
context of the Inequality. Part III identifies the conditions necessary to
make the Inequality hold true in the market for corporate bonds, the
impact of Dodd-Frank, and the next steps that must be taken.
I. RATING AGENCIES: HISTORY AND THE CRISES
CRAs, a product of the industrial age, were developed to provide
investors with much needed information for making investing more
manageable in a rapidly growing technological world.14 These agencies
took complex data and combined it to produce a single neat symbol.15
13. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the Enron bankruptcy and the 2008
Financial Crisis.
14. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 1–2.
15. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 638–39 (1999). A CRA,
after analyzing all the available data on a certain bond, instrument, or organization, will
provide its opinion on the likelihood that the issuer will default on its obligations. See
id. at 641. CRA’s opinion is reflected on both ordinal (A,B,C) and cardinal (AAA, AA,
A) scales. Id. at 642. However, there are two general categories: “investment grade”
(i.e. AAA–BBB) and speculative or not investment grade (BB–D). SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N., REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 702(B) OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 25 (2003) [hereinafter SEC CRA REPORT], available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. A triple “A” rating,
whether a Moody’s AAA or an S&P Aaa, implies an “extremely strong capacity” to
satisfy the debt commitment. See STANDARD & POOR’S FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.L.C.,
STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS DEFINITIONS (June 22, 2012), available at
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In 1909, John Moody, inspired by mercantile rating agencies, took the
next step and provided security ratings for railroad bonds in a single
book.16 Moody’s was soon joined by Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) in
1916 and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924. 17 Moody’s initial
publication contained only unsolicited ratings, and in the first half of the
twentieth century, all CRAs operated on a pure investor paid
subscription model.18
It was not until 1970, when Penn Central defaulted on $82 million
in commercial paper, that CRAs began to transition to the issuer paid
model.19 This shift allowed CRAs to eliminate the free rider effect that
discouraged new investor subscriptions,20 raise funds that would allow
for greater information gathering, 21 and gain access to non-public
company information from obligor participation.22 Today, CRAs charge
based on the size and complexity of the rated security, although it is
typically two to three basis points of a bond’s face amount at issuance.23
The switch in the financial models allowed S&P and Moody’s to expand
internationally and grow exponentially in size, as well as increase the
number and types of rated securities.24
Over the years, CRAs have become an integral part of the financial
system, having been incorporated into the regulation of the markets and
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/general/RatingsDirect_Commentary_979212_06
_22_2012_12_42_54.pdf; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., RATING SYMBOLS &
DEFINITIONS 5–7 (June 2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004.
16. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 638.
17. See id. at 639.
18. See id. at 640; see also Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4.
19. Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4.
20. Photocopies and faster methods of communications made it difficult to control
the free rider problem. Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 43, 51 (2004).
21. As the quantity and size of the commercial paper market increased in the
1960s, CRAs began having difficulties keeping up with the amount of securities they
needed to rate given the limited funds that a subscription would produce. Cantor &
Packer, supra note 4, at 4.
22. Lynch, supra note 3, at 239–40. The issuer pay model does provide an
advantage in that CRAs are privy to private company information and are able to issue
their rating before a bond is issued. See id. at 242–43. Prior to the 1930s, ratings were
announced after the bond was issued and could only affect the secondary market for the
bond. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 643.
23. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 652–53.
24. See id. at 648–49. In the span of 20 years, the staff at S&P and Moody’s grew
from less than 50 to 1,200-1,700. Id.
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securities at both the Federal and state levels.25 In 1975, the government
provided the classification of nationally recognized statistical rating
organization (“NRSRO”) to those CRAs whose ratings could be used for
regulatory purposes in an effort to differentiate between the upstart
CRAs and those that met government standards.26 Frank Partnoy, a law
professor at the University of San Diego and one of the earliest and
well-known critics of CRAs, described NRSROs as grantors of
regulatory licenses and “gatekeepers of the bond market” because their
ratings made compliance with regulations simpler and cheaper for both
issuers and investors.27 Even without their regulatory role, NRSROs are
important to an issuer of corporate bonds. The issuer asks one or more
NRSROs to rate their bonds, and the rating, which reflects the rate of
default, correlates with the issuer’s cost of capital.28 A higher assigned
rating means more liquidity, lower cost of capital, and a wider potential
investor pool (e.g., mutual funds and insurance companies) for the
issuer.29
A. ENRON AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
In theory, NRSROs are meant to be unbiased experts of companies
and securities; 30 however, the past decade has brought to light
significant flaws in both the quality of the ratings and the business

The number of outstanding rated bonds expanded from about 5,500 in 1975 to
approximately 20,000 domestic bond issuers and 1,200 international by 1995. Id.
25. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS 104 (Comm. Print 2002)
[hereinafter WATCHDOGS REPORT] (“[A]t least eight Federal statutes and 47 Federal
regulations, along with over 100 State laws and regulations, reference NRSRO ratings
as a benchmark.”).
26. SEC CRA REPORT, supra note 15, at 5–6. While the label “NRSRO” was
created in 1975, it was not until 1997 that the government attempted to officially define
NRSROs, though it did not act on the proposed rule. Id. Additionally, until 2006,
NRSRO status would be informally granted in a “no-action” letter. Id.
27. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 681–82. A significant part of the NRSRO reform in
Dodd-Frank was to remove the regulatory reliance on rating. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885 (2010).
28. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246.
29. See id. at 247.
30. WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 52 (stating that the public expects
CRAs to be “unbiased and accurate assessors of various companies’ financial
conditions”).
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model of NRSROs.31 Enron first shocked the investment community in
2001 with its bankruptcy, and then in 2008, the subprime mortgage
crisis threatened the entire global economy.32 Center stage in the midst
of these crises was NRSROs.
1. Enron
On December 2, 2001 Enron filed for bankruptcy.33 A mere four
days earlier, Enron’s ratings by all “big three” CRAs34 were still above
investment grade.35 Investigations after the fact revealed plenty of early
signs of impending doom that NRSROs should have noticed. 36 The
warnings started in early October when Enron informed the agencies of
a $1 billion write-down of after-tax income and a $1.2 billion
shareholder equity reduction. 37 Further signs included an SEC
investigation into several partnerships of Enron’s CFO designed to hide
the company’s losses and debts;38 the $500 million earning restatement
that Enron issued on November 8th; 39 and the $690 million demand
obligations that S&P downgrades triggered that Enron hid from the
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-240, CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES: ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS FOR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter “GAO REPORT 12-240].
32. Id.
33. Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN.
L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2003). Enron was not the only corporation that collapsed in the
early 2000s; it was closely followed by other companies in deep financial problems.
Notably, WorldCom caused another round of criticism of CRAs for yet again failing to
timely lower WorldCom’s rating to reflect its financial troubles and pending
bankruptcy. See Marie Leone, Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act, CFO.COM (Oct.
2, 2006), www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7991492/c_7989907=TodayInFinance_Inside.
34. The “big three” refers to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, which combined to handle
over 90% of all ratings for almost every class of securities. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
2011 SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF EACH
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION (Sept. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsro_section15e_
examinations_summary_report.pdf.
35. See Hill, supra note 33, at 1149. While Enron was above investment grade
until November 28, 2001, the company was downgraded by all three agencies starting
from October 25th and teetered a notch above junk most of November. WATCHDOGS
REPORT, supra note 25, at 85–88.
36. See generally SEC CRA Report, supra note 15.
37. WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 85.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id. at 88.
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agencies until its quarterly filings on November 19th.40 The agencies
tried to shift part of the blame on Enron for providing false and
misleading information;41 however, the investigating Senate Committee
found that CRAs’ efforts “fell far below the careful efforts one would
have expected from organizations whose ratings hold so much
importance.” 42 The Enron credit ratings were solicited, the ratings were
not maintained solely based on public information, and all three
agencies had open lines of communications with Enron staff, which the
issuer pay model allows. 43 The main problems were an insufficient
review of company materials, the lack of diligent investigations into
emerging problems, a focus on short-term rather than long-term
creditworthiness, blindly accepting Enron’s officers’ words, a lack of
inquisitiveness, and the agencies’ lack of accountability.44
2. Financial Crisis of 2008
The Enron scandal paled in comparison to the financial crisis of
2008.45 The catalyst of the debacle was the high-risk mortgage lending
at the height of the housing bubble where mortgages would be sold off,
packaged in pools, and underwritten for investors to purchase.46 Since
these mortgaged-backed securities were sold into the private market and
not guaranteed by the government, investors demanded ratings for the
pools, a task which fell to NRSROs.47 At the height of the bubble, the
ratings provided by NRSROs were greatly overinflated48 and NRSROs’
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 90.
See id.
Id. at 90–98.
Neal Lipschutz, Ten Years Later, Enron Pales in Comparison, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 30, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/11/30/ten-years-laterenron-pales-in-comparison/.
46. See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT
ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2008), available at http://media.hoover.org/
sites/default/files/documents/PWGPolicyStateMktTurmoilFinal03122008—FINAL.pdf.
47. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the
Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1121–22 (2009).
48. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 6 (2011) [hereinafter WALL STREET AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/
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agents would directly advise the issuers on how certain pool attributes
would affect a rating, prior to actually establishing a rating.49 CRAs
issued ratings for tens of thousands of United States residential
mortgaged-back securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs).50 Most of these securities were rated investment grade (many
AAA), 51 despite being backed by high risk loans. 52 Even when
homeowners began defaulting on their subprime mortgages in 2006,
CRAs did not heed these signs and continued issuing investment grade
ratings.53 Finally, in July of 2007, CRAs began downgrading thousands
of their ratings for RMBS and CDOs in a very short period of time.54
Overall, about 90% of RMBS originally rated AAA in 2006 and 2007
were downgraded to junk status.55 This sudden change forced banks,
insurance companies, and pension funds, whose regulatory requirements
obligated them to hold only highly-rated investments, to sell. 56 The
RMBS and CDO markets froze and collapsed in a matter of months.57

doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2.
49. Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer
Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 605, 641.
50. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6. While
bonds are debt obligations of the issuer for a given amount which is paid out by the
issuer, RMBS and CDO are significantly more complex because they are actually a
securitization of pools of someone else’s debt. Before an RMBS is formed, an
originator enters into a mortgage contract. Id. at 649. The originator then sells a pool of
these mortgages (or some other income producing assets) to a special purpose vehicle
(“SPV”), which issues securities in that pool to investors. Id. The income received
from the mortgage payments of the RMBSs are divided to provide the principal and
interest payments of the RMBS. Id. CDOs are formed in a manner similar to RMBSs,
but the securities (and the payouts) are two-tiered. Id. When rating an RMBS or a
CDO, NRSRO must look at all the underlying debt obligations in the pool to estimate
the chance of default.
51. See supra note 15 for an explanation of rating categories.
52. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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B. LESSONS FROM OUR PAST
The last decade has shredded the image of CRAs as unbiased
specialists there to help investors.58 Instead, as a managing director of
Moody’s admitted, “[c]ombined, these errors make us look either
incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for
revenue, or a little bit of both.” 59 While the outcome might not
necessarily point to incompetence, the critics, the Senatorial
Subcommittee, and SEC all found glaring errors in the running of
CRAs.60 The most severe criticisms have been the lack of regulation,
conflicts of interest that led to inflated ratings and regulatory arbitrage,
and rate shopping.61
1. Lack of Regulation
The initial problem affecting CRA performance was that there was
no regulatory system for CRAs. 62 Until 1997, there was no official
definition for NRSROs even though the term has been used since
1975.63 It was only in 2006 that a formal system was established for
granting a company the status of NRSRO,64 even though there were
more than 100 laws that used NRSRO ratings as a benchmark at the
time. 65 It was not until after the Enron debacle that the government
started considering regulating NRSROs, though the question of to what
extent still lacks an answer.66

58.
59.
60.
61.

See generally WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 115–25.
WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245.
See generally id. at 243–317.
See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 89–95; WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245–46.
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
64. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006)); see also infra Part II.A.
65. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 104.
66. While both the CRARA and the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with
certain powers to regulate the registration of NRSROs, neither act gave the SEC the
ability to regulate content of a rating since that would infringe on CRAs’ First
Amendment rights. See infra Part II.A.
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2. Conflict of Interest
Another large problem contributing to the downfall of Enron and
the Financial Crisis was the number of complications born of the issuer
pay model.67 There is a glaring conflict of interest when the entity being
rated pays the rating institution.68 Both the SEC and the Senate reports
highlighted the increased chance of inflated ratings.69 Since a higher
rating could allow an issuer to have a lower cost of capital and a wider
investment pool, 70 the issuer is interested in obtaining the highest
possible rating.71 The issuer is also interested in maintaining the highest
rating to avoid a decline in its liquidity and the triggering of rating-based
clauses in their contracts.72 CRAs, as private for-profit companies, need
to satisfy their customers, but that obligation conflicts with their primary
purpose of providing information about bonds and issuers to investors.73
Additionally, there are regulatory advantages that an investment grade
rating can secure.74 A rating could reduce the administrative and legal
costs in filing an S-3 rather an S-1 with the SEC75 or open the security to
a pool of large institutional investors like money market mutual funds,
pension funds, and insurance companies who are restricted by
regulations in the type of securities they may hold.76

67. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 41; WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 243.
68. See generally Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit
Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2010) (explaining additional
conflicts of interest on the agent level where the actual employee has a conflict of
interest or the agency has an additional interest in having the issuer purchase ancillary
services).
69. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 243.
70. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
71. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 273.
72. Id. For the perfect example of ratings affecting private contracts and securities
post-issuance, consider how the S&P downgrade of Enron triggered a clause in Enron’s
contracts resulting in a $690 million payout to the investor. See WATCHDOGS REPORT,
supra note 25, at 88.
73. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246–47.
74. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 90
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
75. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 691–92; but see 76 Fed. Reg. 46603 (Aug. 3,
2011) (amending the rules through Dodd-Frank).
76. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246.
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3. Rate Shopping
Congress and the SEC are also worried about rating shopping by
issuers.77 Under the current system, the issuer approaches several CRAs
to receive a preliminary rating, and ultimately chooses which to pay to
issue the official rating. 78 Even though the rating industry is an
oligopoly, 79 issuers are able to choose from whom to solicit ratings, and
would logically choose the agency that gives the highest rating. That
places external pressure on CRAs to provide a higher rating than
warranted.80 This was especially worrisome during the financial crisis
because a select few arrangers underwrote very large quantities of CDOs
and RMBSs. 81 As such, losing these large investors as clients could
significantly affect profits at the CRAs.82
Issuers are more likely to select NRSROs that have provided
favorable ratings for their securities in the past, and therefore may be
more likely to inflate their ratings in the future.83 The relationship is
stronger with the more complex and longer maturity bonds because that
is where the rating discrepancy among CRAs is greatest.84 Issuers with
short-term debt who are on the verge of the regulatory minimums85 are
more likely to shop around and solicit just one qualified rating.86 This

77. See WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 244;
see also Bai, supra note 68, at 263.
78. See Bai, supra note 68, at 263.
79. See Darcy, supra note 49, at 641 (“Moody’s reported that its market share [for
structured finance products] declined from 75% to 25% when it increased its rating
standards.”).
80. See id. at 641–42.
81. Darcy, supra note 49, at 639–40. Rate shopping does not just apply to complex
structured products. Recent research has found strong indications that rate shopping is
also prevalent in the corporate bond market. See generally Mathias Kronlund, Best
Face Forward: Does Ratings Shopping Distort Observed Bond Ratings? (Univ. of
Chicago, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/events/
capitalMarket/CMW15M_Kronlund_BestFaceForward.pdf.
82. Darcy, supra note 49, at 639–40
83. See id. at 34.
84. See id.
85. “Regulatory minimum” refers to the Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, which limits securities that a mutual fund may hold to those that have a certain
rating. Id. at 4 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012)).
86. See id. at 22. Kronlund focused on Rule 2a-7, under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, which states that if more than one rating is obtained, then the second
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strategy of shopping around could have two effects: the inflated ratings
could be used to fool investors and to commit regulatory arbitrage.87
The traditional defense to the conflict of interest and rate shopping
problems tainting the issuer pay model was the reputational capital
model.88 Regulators and investors value credit ratings because they are
supposed to be unbiased third-party evaluations meant to bridge the
informational asymmetry between the issuers and investors.89 CRAs’
continued success depends on their reputations: if the investors do not
trust the accuracy of their ratings, that agency’s ratings would be
devalued and unsolicited.90 The reputational theory provides the basis
for the notion that the markets and CRAs will regulate their honesty and
accuracy themselves. 91 In a pre-CRARA study, Federal Reserve staff
found that reputational theory can effectively control conflicts of interest
in the bond market. 92 One of the significant motives of CRAs when
issuing a rating is to maintain their reputation.93 An advisor is only as
good as his advice and CRAs are exposed to reputational worries; 94
however, both Enron and the 2008 Financial Crisis provide enough
ammunition to question whether reputational constraints alone are
enough to curb NRSROs’ conflicts.95

highest rating is considered for the purposes of the rule. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7
(2012)).
87. See id. at 27. Kronlund found that investors are cognizant of rate shopping and
try to compensate through higher yields but was unable to conclude whether or not they
are perfectly able to adjust for the bias. Id.
88. John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”:
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 127.
89. See id. at 158–59.
90. See id.
91. See id.; Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (“Rating agencies are already motivated to
provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is directly tied to
reputation.”).
92. Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Rating
Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 68, 2003), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf.
93. Lynch, supra note 3, at 252.
94. Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 14.
95. See Dennis, supra note 47; Lynch, supra note 3.
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II. THE ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS AND THE OMISSION
OF UNSOLICITED RATINGS
Following Enron and the Financial Crisis of 2008, Congress turned
its attention to the unregulated business of CRAs. 96 The failure to
accurately rate and timely modify ratings contributed to trillion dollar
losses. 97 In response, Congress passed CRARA and Dodd-Frank; 98
however, neither of these pieces of legislation included unsolicited
ratings because the utility of such ratings was uncertain.99 One recent
proposal by Fulghieri recognizes that unsolicited ratings will only be
accurate—and therefore beneficial to the market—when certain factors
hold true in the Inequality.100
A. CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006 AND THE DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM ACT OF 2010
CRARA regulates the CRAs and provides the SEC with oversight
powers;101 however, before CRARA was even fully in effect, the United
States was in another crisis—the Financial Crisis of 2008. 102 DoddFrank was meant to fix the additional defects in NRSROs highlighted by
the Financial Crisis.103
1. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
Although CRAs advocated for continued reliance on the
reputational theory and no regulation, 104 Congress disagreed and
CRARA added Section 15E to the Exchange Act of 1934.105 It was the
96.
97.

WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 123.
See Hill, supra note 33, at 1149; see also WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.
98. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 (2010).
99. Partnoy, supra note 74, at 71.
100. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006).
102. See supra Part I.A.2.
103. Murdock, supra note 3, at 1305–06.
104.
WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 123.
105. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, sec. 4, §15E, 120 Stat.
1327, 1329 (2006) (codified as amended at15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).
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first major piece of legislation that gave the SEC oversight power of
NRSROs. 106 The Credit Reform Act set out the qualifications and
registration procedure for NRSROs. 107
In the application for
registration, the applicant CRA is required to reveal a wealth of
information about its performance and processes.108 The CRA has to
provide data on their credit rating performance measurements over the
short-term (one year), mid-term (three year), and long-term (ten year)
periods.109 Additionally, potential NRSROs are required to detail the
procedures and methodologies used in determining credit ratings.110 An
applicant also has to reveal any conflict of interest it faces relating to the
issuance of credit ratings so that the public is informed of any inherent
problems in the rating process.111 After registration, each NRSRO must
annually file with the SEC the same form with updated data, and certify
its accuracy.112 In July 2007, the SEC promulgated the rules that would
govern NRSROs.113

106. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006). The Act gives the SEC the authority to regulate
NRSRO registration, organization, and procedure. However, the SEC is still not
authorized to “regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and
methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organization
determines credit ratings.” Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B) .
109. Performance is measured by how the assigned grade (and the risk of default)
matches to the actual defaults in the grade. The SEC has implemented the performance
disclosure through Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO. See Application for Registration as a
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (Form NRSRO), available at
www.sec.gov/about/forms/formnrsro.pdf. For each class of credit rating, NRSRO must
provide statistical performance in terms of default and transition rates. Id. But see Lynn
Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective
Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 47, 60, 81 (2010) (disagreeing that
default and transition rates are adequate, choosing instead to look at fallen angel ratios
(securities that began as investment grade but in the period, fell to junk or defaulted),
rating change ratios, and large rating change ratios, which can reveal unstable or
inadequate ratings).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B).
111. Id. In addition to requiring disclosures, the Credit Reform Act gave the SEC
the power to regulate the procedures that NRSROs were required to enact to control
conflict of interest problems, which the SEC did by prescribing a requirement for
establishing NRSRO policies and compliance officers. See id. § 78o-7(h); see also Bai,
supra note 109, at 47.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a).
113. Bai, supra note 109, at 48.
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2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010
The Dodd-Frank Act aimed to address the many problems of the
Financial Crisis, and Title IX specifically focused on NRSROs. 114
Among the many changes instituted by Dodd-Frank was the purging of
the use of the credit ratings from all federal laws,115 and a requirement
that NRSROs develop internal control structures. 116 While the
aforementioned changes are significant, the most relevant features of
Dodd-Frank were the Franken-Wicker Proposal (the 15E(w)
Amendment),117 which has yet to be adopted, and the new disclosure
requirements, 118 which were expanded to create transparency in the
rating process.119 Dodd-Frank and the proposed regulations address two
types of disclosure: those which must accompany each individual rating
and general disclosures about the performance of NRSRO itself.120
a. The Disclosures for Each Rating
Each new or modified rating on a particular security must be
accompanied by a disclosure form that is clear, informative, public,
comparable to other NRSROs, and must include performance
information over a range of years and a variety of credit ratings.121 To
combat the problem of opaque models that were identified in the Senate
Report following the financial crisis,122 NRSROs are required to disclose
114. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955
(2010).
115. Id. § 939, 124 Stat. at 1885.
116. Id. § 932(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1873.
117. Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings,
Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,266 (May 10, 2011)
[hereinafter “Solicitation of Comment”] (proposed 15E(w) Amendment attached); see
Bai, supra note 109, at 50; Dodd-Frank Act § 939F, 124 Stat. at 1889.
118. Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1872 (2010).
119. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(q), 124 Stat. at 1878. The SEC shall
make rules that require disclosure on each initial rating and any subsequent changes
“for the purpose of allowing users of credit ratings to evaluate the accuracy of ratings
and compare the performance of ratings by different nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations.” Id.
120. Id.
121. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,435
(proposed May 18, 2011).
122. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 245.
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methodologies as well as qualitative and quantitative information.123 In
terms of qualitative information, NRSROs must disclose the following
with each rating: 1) the main assumptions and principles used in their
procedures and methodologies; 2) potential limitation and excluded risk
of the ratings; 3) information on the uncertainty of the rating and any
limits on the scope or reliability of the available data; 4) to what extent
third party due diligence services have been used; 5) a description of the
data about the issuer that was used; 6) an assessment of the quality of
the information available; and 7) any information relating to a conflict
of interest. 124 In addition to the extensive qualitative information,
NRSROs must also provide the following quantitative information: 1)
the measure of potential volatility of the rating; 2) the historical
performance of the rating and the probability of default along with the
expected loss in a default event; and 3) the sensitivity of the rating to the
assumptions made in the rating process.125
b. The New Form NRSRO
In addition to making the reports accompanying individual ratings,
Dodd-Frank calls for annual certification of the same qualities through
Form NRSRO. 126 Under the Credit Reform Act, Exhibit 1 of Form
NRSRO requires each agency to provide performance statistics—
specifically transition and default rates—for each class of securities for
the past one, three, and ten years.127 The SEC has noted that since the
Form’s instructions do not provide for a specific methodology or limit
the type of information included, NRSROs used different techniques to
produce ratings, came up with their own ways of presenting the data,
and generally varied in the manner of their disclosure.128 In an effort to
make Exhibit 1 disclosures more uniform and understandable, the SEC
has proposed a standard matrix for Exhibit 1.129 However, two years
123.
124.
125.
126.

Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(s), 124 Stat. at 1879.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,435.
127. See Form NRSRO, supra note 109.
128. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. at 33,525.
129. Id. Below is a sample matrix that would be included with the proposed
instructions:
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after Dodd-Frank and a year after the publication of the proposed rules,
the SEC still has not adopted a final rule.130
c. 15E(w) Amendment
The 15E(w) Amendment was proposed to address conflicts of
interest and rate shopping for complex structured products.131 Its goal
was to create the Credit Rating Agency Board (“the Board”), a selfregulating organization that would assign NRSROs to rate new
structured products rather than having the issuer pick the agency. 132
Any issuer seeking an initial rating of a structured finance product
would apply to the Board and the Board would select a NRSRO from a
pool of qualified agencies to produce the rating.133 To become part of
this pool of agencies, NRSROs would have to submit an application to
the Board to be considered a “qualified NRSRO” (“QNRSRO”).134 The
Board would review each QNRSRO’s performance annually, and future

Figure 1
Corporate Issuers — 10-Year Transition and Default Rates
(December 31, 2000 through December 31, 2010)
Credit # Of Ratings
Rating Outstanding

AAA AA

A

BBB BB

B

CCC CC

Scale

as of 12/31/2000

AAA

10

50% 10%

AA

2000

1% 39% 12% 10% 8% 5% 4%

C

Default

Paid Withdrawn
Off (other)
40%

1%

19% 1%

A

4000

6% 34% 15% 10% 6% 4% 3%

2%

18% 2%

BBB

3600

2% 9% 28% 15% 10% 6% 5% 1% 4%

17% 3%

BB

1000

2% 4% 20% 14% 5%

2%

16% 37%

B

500

1% 3% 6% 20% 20% 15%

15%

15% 5%

CCC

300

4% 6% 15% 25% 20% 20%

4% 6%

CC

200

2% 8% 10% 38% 30%

2% 10%

C

160

2% 8% 10% 67%

1% 12%

Total

11,770

130. See SEC Proposed Rules: 2011, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/proposedarchive/proposed2011.shtml (last modified
Nov. 19, 2012).
131. Bai, supra note 109, at 49.
132. Id. at 50; see also Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456,
76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,279 (May 10, 2011).
133. Id. at 28,287–88.
134. Solicitation of Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. at 28,287.
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assignment by the Board would depend on this past performance. 135
Rather than adopting the amendment immediately, Section 939F of
Dodd-Frank calls for an SEC study and a recommendation on the
feasibility of the 15E(w) Amendment or some other similar system.136
Based on the directive of Section 939F, the SEC issued a
solicitation for comment137 on the 15E(w) amendment, as well as five
alternatives to the 15E(w) Amendment.138 Of note is the option for the
maintenance and expansion of Rule 17g-5—the equal access rule. 139
Rule 17g-5, 140 promulgated pursuant to § 17 of the Exchange Act,
requires that if a hired NRSRO has a conflict of interest141 when rating a
structured finance product,142 it must make the information available and
accessible to other non-hired NRSROs on a password protected
website.143 The rule limits non-hired NRSROs’ access by providing that
they may not utilize the website more than ten times a year.144 If greater
admittance is desired, the individual NRSRO must issue and maintain a
credit rating for at least ten percent of all securities whose information is
viewed.145 The program’s purpose is to encourage unsolicited ratings.146
In the above-mentioned solicitation for comment, the SEC inquired if
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 28,291.
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
See generally Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76
Fed. Reg. 28,265 (May 10, 2011).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 28,275. Other options include the investor-owned credit rating agency
model, stand-alone model, the designation model, and the user-pay model.
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b) (2012).
141. Id. Conflicts of interest include: 1) being paid by the issuer, underwriter, or
obligor for the security that they will issue, underwrite, or be obligors for, 2) being paid
for additional ancillary services, 3) being paid by persons for subscriptions who will use
the rating to comply or obtain statutory or regulatory benefits or own investments which
could be beneficially or adversely affected by credit ratings; 4) having NRSRO
employees own securities in the issuer or have more than an arms-length relationship
with issuer, 5) being a broker or dealer who is in the business of underwriting securities
and is associated with NRSRO. Id.
142. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3). For purposes of the requirement, complex financial
products include all securities or money market instruments issued by an asset pool or
as part of an asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction. Id.
143. Id. § 240.17g-5.
144. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii)(B).
145. Id.
146. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov.
23, 2009).
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the existing Rule 17g-5 program, with possible modifications, is an
adequate model to curb the conflicts of interest.147
The SEC published the results of their study in December 2012,
which mainly featured a summary of all the submitted comments. 148
The SEC study did not reach an ultimate decision but rather
recommended the formation of a roundtable for further study.149 While
academics supported the adoption of Amendment 15E(w) as the only
workable solution to the conflict of interest problem, the top three
NRSROs and the majority of commentators took the position that
Amendment 15E(w) was unworkable, against public policy, too costly,
and would decimate the competition among NRSROs.150 Instead, they
expressed the belief that a modified and enhanced Rule 17g-5 is a viable
alternative solution because the disclosure that would accompany
unsolicited ratings and unsolicited comments151 would be sufficient to
control the conflict of interest.152 As commentators pointed out, if any
version of the 15E(w) Amendment is accepted, it would mean
unprecedented government interference into a private industry and an
assault on the self-regulation and the reputational theory that has guided
the CRA industry since its inception.153
147. See Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg.
28,265, 28,276 (May 10, 2011).
148. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Report to Congress on Assigned Credit Ratings (Dec.
24, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/assigned-credit-ratingsstudy.pdf (hereinafter “SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study”).
149. Id. at 73.
150. See id. at 30–52 (reporting that a majority of commentators found that the
15E(w) Amendment has problems of moral hazard, feasibility, independence,
accountability, reduction of competition, transparency, and market acceptance).
151. Unsolicited comments are opinion letters issued by various NRSROs regarding
a specific security and the rating that the hired NRSRO provided. See Comment Letter
from Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, The Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 18 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-16.pdf.
Unlike
unsolicited
ratings,
comments are less expensive feedback for the non-hired NRSROs since they do not
necessitate the regulatory compliance and the post rating monitoring that official ratings
would require. Id. Quite a few of such unsolicited comments have been issued since the
implementation of Rule 17g-5. Id.
152. See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra note 148, at 55–56.
153. Id. at 33, 36–37. As a comparison, the greatest blame from the Enron scandal
fell on the public accounting firms. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The accounting firms, blamed for the Enron
scandal, also faced conflicts of interest on both the individual employee level (through
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B. THE ROLE OF UNSOLICITED RATINGS IN THE NEW REFORM SCHEME
While NRSROs were brought into the regulatory fold in 2006,
there was little mention of unsolicited ratings since they slowly faded
from practice in the late 1990s. At the turn of the century, there was
confusion as to whether unsolicited ratings were tools of blackmail or a
market check, since it was possible to abuse the unsolicited rating
process. In analyzing these dual motives for unsolicited ratings,
Fulghieri and his colleagues recognized that in the state of the
Inequality, unsolicited ratings would have a positive impact.
The regulation of NRSROs includes some SEC staples such as
registration and disclosure, as well as some radically new proposals, but
neither the Credit Reform Act nor the Dodd-Frank Act addresses the
issue of unsolicited ratings. 154 The subscriber pay model was the
standard in the credit rating industry from their inception until the
1970s,155 and even in the 1990s, after switching to an issuer pay model,
both Moody’s and S&P rated all SEC-registered domestic securities
regardless of solicitation. 156 However, after Jefferson County School
District sued Moody’s over the unsolicited rating of its bonds in the late
1990s, 157 claiming that the rating was retaliation for not hiring Moody’s
to rate their security, the practice acquired a negative reputation. The
issue of unsolicited ratings sparked an investigation by the Justice
Department 158 and the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer. 159
lateral positions) and the company wide strata (through the purchase of ancillary
services). Id. at 684. Yet, even after Enron, reporting companies still choose their own
accounting firms even though the accounting sector is strictly regulated and overseen
by the SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 745, 797 (2002).
154. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(2006); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955
(2010).
155. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4.
156. Id. at 5. S&P limited their policy to only domestic SEC registered securities
while Moody’s would also issue unsolicited rating to both structured products and
foreign bonds. Id.
157. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848,
856 (10th Cir. 1999).
158. Report: Justice Department Investigating Moody’s Credit Agency, AP NEWS
ARCHIVE (Mar. 27, 1996, 8:33 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/ReportJustice-Department-Investigating-Moody-s-Credit-Agency/id-cd839aaea5098 c72f7707
3dabd8cc702.
159. Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, Attorney General Investigates Moody’s Credit
Rating Policies, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
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Although both investigations did not lead to charges,160 Moody’s, S&P
and Fitch161 abandoned mandatory policies of providing ratings for all
securities.162
Does that mean that unsolicited ratings are illegal tools in the hands
of NRSROs? The SEC did not necessarily think so as demonstrated by
its attempt to encourage unsolicited ratings for structured financial
products in Rule 17g-5.163 Rule 17g-5 makes the issuance of unsolicited
ratings for financial products possible and easier, and the SEC
envisioned that they would act as a check on rate shopping by
disseminating a true—or lower—rating that frustrates the very reason
for shopping around.164 The ability of non-hired NRSROs to view the
underlying data necessary to produce a rating would also produce more
accurate ratings because under the new Rules 17g-5 and 17g-2, both
investors and NRSROs have a greater insight into the methodologies of
and any mistakes made by the hired NRSRO.165 According to the new
rules, unsolicited ratings would alleviate rate shopping, increase

fullpage.html?res=9401E1DB113FF933A05754C0A9639C8B63.
160. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Justice Dept. Inquiry on Moody’s Is Over, With No
Charges Filed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/
03/13/business/justice-dept-inquiry-on-moody-s-is-over-with-no-charges-filed.html.
161. Fitch, which never adhered to a mandatory policy, uses the term “shadow
rating” to refer to its unsolicited ratings that are based on largely public information.
See Winnie P. H. Poon & Michael Firth, Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower?
International Evidence From Bank Ratings, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1741, 1743–44
(2005).
162. Moody’s current policy states: “MIS’s publication of an unsolicited Credit
Rating will be based, among other factors, on MIS’s assessment of the usefulness of the
rating to the capital markets, and our determination that sufficient information is
available to allow MIS to assign and maintain the rating.” Policy for Designating
Unsolicited Credit Ratings in the European Union, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., 1
(2011), available at www.moodys.com/designating_unsolicited_ratings_in_the_eu.
S&P does not publish an official policy, but even as late as 2004, S&P did claim that it
would assign a rating for all public corporate debt over $50 million. Hill, supra note 20,
at 51. As for Fitch, they issue unsolicited ratings on a case by case basis. Id.
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2012); see Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act
Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,276 (May 10, 2011); Amendments to
Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov. 23, 2009).
164. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
165. Id.
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However,
accuracy of ratings, and provide competition. 166
commentators worried that the non-hired NRSROs would use
unsolicited ratings as a threat by purposely producing a low rating; the
SEC maintained that such ratings would be beneficial.167
C. THE INEQUALITY
A big question remains: are unsolicited ratings a positive tool or a
bullying technique against creditors?168 The government agencies seem
divided between investigating the motivations behind unsolicited ratings
on the one hand,169 and encouraging their use on the other.170 Fulghieri
recently proposed a new theory.171 Taking into account CRAs’ ability to
issue unsolicited ratings, their ability to misrepresent the issuer’s credit
quality through false ratings, and their own reputational concerns,
Fulghieri explains that a tension under the issuer-pay model exists
because of the potential for short-term profits by producing an inflated
rating and the long-term reputational loss that stems from said inflated
rating. 172 Extending the rationale to unsolicited ratings, providing
unsolicited and inaccurate ratings—like those alleged in Jefferson
County School District—acts as a forced incentive to the issuer to obtain
a solicited rating.173 With this threat, CRAs can charge higher fees for
the solicited favorable ratings and produce short-term profits. 174
Economic theorists predict that issuers will pay additional fees up to the
present value of the costs that an unfavorable bond rating would
create.175 However, by issuing accurate ratings, CRAs can improve their
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Soku Byoun, Information Content of Unsolicited Credit Ratings and Incentives
of Rating Agencies: A Theory 20 (Baylor University Working Paper, 2011), available at
www.apjfs.org/conference/2011/cafmFile/12-1.pdf (“Despite controversy surrounding
unsolicited ratings, there has been little effort to understand the nature of unsolicited
ratings.”).
169. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text for discussion of the DOJ
investigation.
170. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 17g5’s encouragement of unsolicited ratings.
171. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3–4.
172. See id. at 2–3.
173. See id. at 3.
174. See id. at 3–4.
175. CHRISTOPHER R. THOMAS & S. CHARLES MAURICE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS
(9th ed. 2007), available at http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0073402818/
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reputation by demonstrating that they do not create inflated ratings,
thereby achieving a long-term profit.176 Balancing these two conflicting
motivations, Fulghieri provides that if short-term profits outweigh longterm losses, CRAs will have an incentive to use unsolicited ratings as a
threat against issuers, leading to less stringent rating standards. 177
Conversely, if short-term profits are smaller than long-term losses,
CRAs will issue accurate ratings that produce more stringent rating
standards and improve social welfare. 178 In order to ensure that
unsolicited ratings are beneficial to the market, short-term gains from
threatening inaccurate ratings have to be smaller than the long-term
losses from reputational theory: this is the Inequality.179
III. USING UNSOLICITED RATINGS FOR GOOD
In the last few years, Congress has given up on NRSROs selfregulation and has attempted to generate accuracy of ratings through
disclosures and the 15E(w) Amendment. 180 NRSROs have become
integral to the United States financial system, and their inability to
adequately control conflicts of interest and rate shopping carries steep
consequences.181 NRSROs provide future predictions for both simple
bonds and extremely complex products; Professor John Coffee even
compared the task of rating complex financial products to brain
student_view0/chapter3/ (positing that optimization occurs when marginal cost equals
marginal benefit).
176. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.
177. See id.
178. See id. Social welfare will be improved by eliminating negative net present
value (“NPV”) projects by issuers. Accurate credit ratings, which can better predict
negative NPV projects by considering the chance of default, therefore increases social
welfare. Id.
179. See id. at 30. The model provides a framework for analyzing the reforms in
Dodd-Frank. In his work, Fulghieri also concludes that there is no downward bias for
unsolicited ratings because in equilibrium, high-quality issuers acquire favorable
solicited ratings whereas low-quality issuers would not bother seeking a solicited rating
and would receive deserving low unsolicited ratings. See supra notes 168–73. The
unsolicited ratings further reflect the incentive of CRAs to maximize profits through
threats. See infra Part II.B. Fulghieri’s reasoning, in this respect ignores the motivations
of the issuers that might produce an inflated solicited rating.
180. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 932, 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872,
1889 (2010).
181. NRSROs were one of the main causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008. See FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at xxv.
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surgery.182 In such an intricate system, it is better for the market and the
sophisticated players to control themselves rather than trying to impose
a system such as the 15E(w) Amendment.183
Unsolicited ratings can be a market mechanism in which the
NRSROs will check and control each other by issuing accurate ratings
that will frustrate rate shopping and curb the conflict of interest.184 The
issuer does not pay CRAs issuing the unsolicited rating, so there are no
incentives for the CRA to provide a better rating for the issuer in order
to keep its business.185 Additionally, though the issuer can choose to
shop around for the most favorable ratings,186 the unfavorable one will
still be published and so the entire exercise of rate shopping becomes
futile.187
This positive result of unsolicited ratings can be achieved if the
state of the Inequality holds true and the long term reputational costs of
inaccurate unsolicited ratings outweigh the short-term gains from such
inaccuracies. 188 Section A will discuss how the Inequality can be
achieved theoretically. Section B will consider how the Dodd-Frank
disclosure requirements contribute to making the Inequality hold true
and the problems that the 15E(w) Amendment pose to the Inequality.
Section C will provide additional recommendations to the existing
regulatory scheme which will promote the Inequality.
A. ESTABLISHING THE INEQUALITY
Fulghieri provided the circumstances in which unsolicited ratings
can lead to more accuracy and higher social welfare: when long-term
reputational costs are greater than the short-term profits from purposely
inaccurate ratings.189 The point drawn from the Inequality is not that the
182. John Coffee Jr., Rating Reform: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 231, 233 (2011).
183. For additional support to this argument in the context of complex financial
products, see SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra note 148, at 56–57.
184. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov.
23, 2009).
185. For the discussion of conflicts of interests of solicited rating, see supra Part
I.B.2.
186. See supra Part I.B.3.
187. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 63,844.
188. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.
189. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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reputational theory is futile, but rather that reputation is one factor to
consider in the decision making process of NRSROs. 190 Ultimately,
regulators should not abandon reliance on the reputational theory or the
free market, but manipulate the existing reputational motive to achieve
the state propounded in the Inequality. This is especially true in the
bond market where reputational concerns are stronger.191
To make the Inequality work, regulators can increase the
reputational costs and/or seek to depress the short-term profits.192 The
difficulty with altering reputational costs is that they are both long
term 193 and hard to measure. 194 To increase the value of one’s
reputation, a regulator must bring the realization event closer to the
present and set up a system where accuracy can be better evaluated. For
profits from short-term threats, the entire cost comes from the effect that
a lower unsolicited rating will have on a bond. 195 The stronger the
effect, the higher the cost of the bond will be to the issuer, and the more
motivation the issuer will have to solicit a rating, even at a higher fee.196
While it is impossible to control the effect the issuance of the rating will
have on the market, regulation can target CRA’s motive—the higher
fee.197

190. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4; Lynch, supra note 3, at 252–53;
Dennis, supra note 47, at 1132.
191. See Covitz & Harrison, supra note 92, at 2, 5.
192. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3-4 (analyzing how the weight of
short-term profits or threats can affect the Inequality).
193. Lynch, supra note 3, at 287–88 (“Secondly, if benefits are to be derived from
issuing unsolicited ratings, such benefits are likely to be realized only after a prolonged
period—likely many years, if not a decade—of issuing such ratings.”).
194. Id. at 288 (“[P]atterns of accuracy (or inaccuracy) only reveal themselves over
time, if at all, as enough debtors perform or default on their obligations, and such
performance can be compared to the earlier ratings issued by a rating agency. Such
prolonged periods also give NRSROs, whose ratings might be assessed and perhaps
called into question by such unsolicited ratings, ample opportunity to seek short-term
(and, indeed, medium-term) profits by issuing inaccurately high ratings. NRSROs
issuing inaccurate ratings are simply unlikely to be ‘caught’ in the short-term.”).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75.
197. Dennis, supra note 47, at 1133.
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1. How to Measure Inaccuracy
In any bond rating situation, one of four scenarios is possible. The
NRSRO: 1) provides an accurate rating and the issuer defaults; 2)
provides an accurate rating and the issuer does not default; 3) provides
an inaccurate rating and the issuer defaults; 4) provides an inaccurate
rating but the issuer does not default.198 The only way to measure the
performance of an NRSRO is by looking at the default of the issuer.199
If Moody’s rates an issuer “Baa,” the fourth highest rating, it means that
the issuer’s bond has some speculative characteristics.200 Statistically,
Baa bonds have a less than six percent default rate in the long term.201
However, when an issuer defaults on a specific security, it is still
difficult to draw a conclusion as to the accuracy of the rating (at the time
it was given) in light of the default.202
While it is impossible to identify each of the four scenarios, it is
possible to identify trends.203 Hypothetically, if the default percentage
on Baa-rated corporate bonds suddenly increased from six to ten
percent, or the fourth highest rating at other rating agencies only
produced a two percent default rate (compared to Moody’s six percent
rate), the apparent conclusion is that Moody’s rating process is
flawed.204 Prior to the Credit Reform Act, the only way investors could
obtain performance data was to subscribe to a Moody’s or S&P report of
their own performance statistics or calculate an appropriate default rate
for each grade and asset type.205 The Credit Reform Act requires each
NRSRO to provide an annual certification under Form NRSRO, which
198.
199.
200.

Lynch, supra note 3, at 288.
Id.
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., RATING SYMBOLS & DEFINITIONS 4
(2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?
docid=PBC_79004.
201. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM NRSRO
2011, at 71 ex.1 (2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/Pages/reg001002.aspx.
202. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288.
203. Bai, supra note 109, at 60, 81 (providing matrices and regressions to evaluate
performance based on default rates).
204. See id.
205. Moody’s still provides a monthly default report available to registered users.
See Default & Ratings Analytics, MOODY’S, http://www.moodys.com/Pages/
rr003_0.aspx?bd=4294966834&rd=&ed=&tb=0&po=0&sb=&sd=0 (last visited May
12, 2012). Similarly, S&P provides annual and periodic default reports. See Default
Studies, Credit & Economic Trends, STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/gfir/en/us (last visited May 12, 2012).
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makes default rates publicly available for observers to monitor
performance.206
2. Bringing the Future Closer to the Present
Just as it takes time for a rating agency’s reputation to improve,207 it
takes time for a reputation to be ruined.208 For instance, it was not until
2007 that the inaccuracies in rating CDOs and RMBSs of the “big three”
NRSROs were revealed; by this time, the NRSROs made billions off of
the lucrative asset-backed securities.209 When S&P or Moody’s issue an
inflated rating, the agency is cognizant that the rating underestimates the
probability of default; however, the statistics on those facts may not be
available for years.210 At the same time, a CRA that issues an accurate
unsolicited rating will also not see the fruits of its labor until the relevant
statistics become available.211
Until this point in the Note, reputation was discussed as a concept.
The desired Inequality, however, is based on valuation.212 The question
for NRSROs is how much reputational loss or gain in the future is worth
today, which can be approximated using the NPV formula.213 Applying
this formula to the decision-making process, an unsolicited rater will
seek to ensure that the amount it spends today to rate a bond will be less
that the probable future business that will result from the accuracy of its
rating.214 That future amount must be discounted to the present value,
and the greater the reputational gain from the accurate rating that
206. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text for all the information that
must be provided in the initial NRSRO application and annual updates in the
certification.
207. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288.
208. The reputational consequences are the same for both the solicited and
unsolicited rater. See supra Part II.C.
209. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 149.
210. In the financial crisis of 2008, the problems did not become apparent until the
teaser rate on the variable rate mortgages expired. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note
25, at 90–98. For bonds, the default event can stretch all the way to maturity.
211. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288.
212. Only cardinal numbers can produce a mathematical equation or, in this case, an
inequality.
213. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.28(b) (2012). The NPV formula may be expressed as the
sum of the discounted cash flows Ct/(1+r)t where “r” is the discount rate, “t” is the time,
and “C” is the net cash flow for the time period (t). Id.
214. See id.
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accrues, the less the present value will be worth.215 A rational CRA will
not undertake an unsolicited rating if its calculation produces a negative
NPV. 216 The most effective solution is to decrease the time for the
reputational effects to be recognized. This can be achieved by making
NRSROs provide more statistics on their performances, specifically
statistics covering various time periods.217 For instance, an issuer has a
particularly strong interest in receiving an investment grade rating for
borderline investment grade bonds,218 and as such, NRSROs have more
motivation to inflate the rating into the investment grade category.219 By
making NRSROs provide information in staggered increments, investors
can see where solicited NRSROs are inflating ratings and where they are
more accurate due to the frequency of performance review and the three
varying time periods used in the evaluations.220
The Credit Reform Act established a system for shorter reflection
periods. Under Form NRSRO, CRAs must provide transition and
default rates for all outstanding ratings in one, three, and ten year
increments.221 This system identifies default rates in the long and short
terms.222 Through this regulation, Congress has taken the first step to
increasing the cost of reputation by bringing the realization event closer
to the present.223

215. Assuming the cost of the rating is C0, the payoff in the future from improved
reputation is Ct, the NPV formula would be NPV= -C0 + Ct/(1+r)t. The longer the time
period (t), the greater the denominator and the less the future gain will be worth.
216. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. The inverse logic will apply to
a solicited CRA; it will calculate a present gain from an inflated rating and a future loss
in reputation and if the calculation yields a positive NPV, CRA should provide an
inflated rating.
217. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (noting that new disclosure requirements are
meant to increase reputational sanctions).
218. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246.
219. See id. at 247.
220. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1878 (2010) (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)) (requiring disclosure for the purpose of allowing
more performance comparison between agencies).
221. See Form NRSRO, supra note 109.
222. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF
FORM NRSRO 2011, supra note 201, at 71 ex.1; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING
SERVICES, STANDARD & POOR’S FORM NRSRO: EXHIBIT 1, available at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/form-nrsro/en/us.
223. See supra notes 227 and 232.
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3. Lowering the Short-Term Profits
The short-term gains from inaccurate and threatening unsolicited
ratings represent the other side of the Inequality equation. 224 These
lower unsolicited ratings can have costly effects for the issuer by
increasing interest rates for their bonds, 225 foiling regulatory
compliance,226 or tripping a clause in an investment contract.227 Since
unsolicited ratings have the power to hurt issuers, issuers may solicit
ratings to avoid the lower, unsolicited ones.228 This dependence allows
CRAs, especially the major three, to ask for a higher fee.229 Due to free
market and free speech protections, regulation cannot affect either the
issuance of the unsolicited rating or its effect on the market. 230
Regulation may, however, try to curtail the higher fee motivation.231
One strategy to prevent the higher fees is to set an industry standard
for issuer pay compensation. The standard can be set by a committee of
representatives comprised of sophisticated investors and CRAs, and the
rate may be based upon the interest rate borne by that bond—for
example two basis points of a bond offering.232 This would prevent an
increase in the price that the unsolicited rating threat might produce.233

224. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3. For an example, see Jefferson
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
225. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 848.
226. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
227. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 88. (discussing Enron’s triggered
payout).
228. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.
229. See id.
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006).
231. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 252–53.
232. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 13–14.
233. Even with a standard price, an inaccurate unsolicited rating may still attract
more business to CRA as the threat of the rating may entice the issuer to solicit multiple
ratings. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. However, a review of the statistics
makes the effectiveness of this strategy unlikely. In Jefferson County School District,
the issuer solicited ratings from both S&P and Fitch but alienated Moody’s. See
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848,856
(10th Cir. 1999). At the time, the only accredited NRSROs were Moody’s, S&P, and
Fitch. Bai, supra note 109, at 50. Currently, there are nine NRSROs, and Fitch has
gained a larger percentage of the market share. Yet, even with the expanded number of
NRSROs, 47.3 % of issuers still solicit ratings from only two agencies and only 28.9%
of issuers solicit ratings from all three. Kronlund, supra note 81, at 32. It is uncertain
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While the concept of setting a standard price for solicited ratings
might be effective in curbing short-term profits from threats, it is a
significant infringement into the free market system and private industry
of credit ratings.234 Setting a standard price would require the creation
of a board with regulatory power over NRSROs, and would restrict each
NRSRO’s ability to adjust its fee based on the complexity and size of
the offering. 235 The SEC has always favored disclosure over direct
influence into the free market, so this particular step should be
considered with caution.236 Currently no regulatory system or proposals
exist to set the standard price for issuing ratings.237
B. HOW DODD-FRANK AFFECTS THE INEQUALITY
In Part A, there were three steps proposed to achieve a state where
the value of reputation is greater than the profits from threatening an
issuer: 1) establishing a system that better measures inaccurate ratings;
2) bringing the reputational realization event closer to the present; and
3) as a last resort, establishing a system of fixed prices for rating.238 The
issue is how Dodd-Frank, whose provisions are still just going into
effect, will contribute to the theoretical model.239 The two significant
changes in Dodd-Frank are the disclosure requirements and the 15E(w)
Amendment.240

whether or not the issuance of additional unsolicited ratings will lead to an increase in
the total number of solicited NRSROs.
234. See SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 13 n.38.
235. See id.
236. Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 524 (2007)
(“There is the recurrent theme throughout the federal securities laws of disclosure,
again disclosure, and still more disclosure.” (internal quotations omitted)).
237. The 1997 proposed rule that that suggested such a practice was never
implemented. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 12–14.
238. See supra Part III.A.
239. While not as popular, unsolicited ratings are still being issued, so the model
Inequality is the deciding factor every time an NRSRO issues an unsolicited rating and
even every time, an NRSRO is not ultimately selected by the issuer after doing the
work, since it then has a choice to issue their already derived rating.
240. See supra Part II.A.2.
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1. Disclosure Requirements
The recently implemented NRSRO application and annual
certification required by CRARA should make it possible to spot the
trends in inaccurate rating, measure performance, and make it easier to
evaluate the reputation of NRSRO sooner by providing performance
data through rating transition, as well as default rates in one, three, and
ten year increments.241 However, Form NRSRO does not proscribe a
particular technique to calculate the statistics, resulting in each NRSRO
providing this information in its own way.242 Dodd-Frank tweaked the
system by requiring that all reports for initial ratings be comparable, and
the SEC proposes to extend that requirement via a revised Form
NRSRO. 243
Another facet of Title IX disclosure changes is the new reports that
must accompany every new rating issuance or modification.244 This will
change the rating process drastically and dispel the days of opaque
models.245 While the new disclosure requirements have not gone into
effect, the exhaustive description of all the information needed creates
an impression that size of rating reports will compare to that of an S-1
filing.246 However, the new disclosures will increase the actual cost of
an unsolicited rating to NRSROs since the rules apply to all ratings, both
solicited and unsolicited.247
In this new report, NRSROs would have to discuss methodologies,
assumptions, limitations, sources and descriptions of data, volatility of
ratings, historical performances, expected probabilities and magnitudes
of a default event, and sensitivity of the rating on assumptions.248 The
purpose of the new requirements is to help the investor understand how
the rating was determined, evaluate its accuracy, and compare
241. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,425
(proposed May 18, 2011).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
245. See WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245
(discussing the problem of opaque models).
246. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
247. Jason W. Parsont, NRSRO Nullification, Why Rating Reform May be in Peril,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1066 (2012).
248. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1879 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78o-7(r)); see also supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
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NRSROs. 249 Such disclosures will allow sophisticated investors, like
institutions, to better gauge the accuracy of a rating, but they will also
provide an added advantage to CRAs issuing unsolicited ratings.250 As
competitors, NRSROs will be able to better judge the quality and
methodologies used for solicited ratings, and the competitor’s criticisms
can be expressed in the form of an unsolicited rating. 251 While this
motive can only affect the investor post-issuance, it is still an internal
market check against excesses and rating inflation.252 It will also allow
for a better evaluation of NRSRO’s performance.253
2. The 15E(w) Amendment
In accordance with § 939F of Dodd-Frank, the SEC conducted and
published a study about reforming NRSROs’ approach to structured
finance products. 254 At the forefront of the study was the 15E(w)
Amendment. 255 In their reply to the request for comment, Senators
Franken and Wickers, the proposers of the Amendment, explained their
idea in greater depth.256 The result will be a semi-closed market where a
Board would assign QNRSROs to provide an initial rating; the selection
process would be based on the job’s size, complexity, and NRSRO’s

249. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1878 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78o-7(q)(1)).
250. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (dual purposes of disclosure).
251. For an example, consider Fitch’s public criticisms of S&P and DBRS’ grading
of triple AAA for $800 million of mortgage-backed securities, where Fitch’s rating
were not solicited because of its more conservative assumptions. Nicole Bullock,
Agencies at Odds Over New Ratings, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2012), available at
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66738d12-7f5b-11e1-a06e-00144feab49a.html.
252. Consider how the issuance of Egan Jones, a subscriber pay agency, ratings
actually ended up lowering the S&P ratings for many of the same securities. Xan Xia &
Gunter Strobl, The Issuer-Pay Rating Model and Rating Inflation: Evidence from
Corporate Credit Ratings 3 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2002186.
253. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (the purpose of disclosure is to allow for better
evaluation).
254. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885 (2010);
SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study supra note 148.
255. Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg.
28,265, 28,266 (May 10, 2011).
256. Comment Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-629/4629-28.pdf.
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past accuracy.257 Depending on the version of the Amendment that will
ultimately get adopted, the fee for such a job may be negotiated by the
NRSRO or established by the Board.258 The issuer can solicit secondary
and tertiary ratings after the initial rating.259 According to the Senators,
this amendment would not affect unsolicited ratings.260 Even if that is
true, the Senators did not address whether the Amendment would affect
Rule 17g-5 disclosures.261 It is uncertain if the QNRSROs would still
have the same conflict of interest, since under the current definition of
conflicts of interest, it seems that even when assigned, they would
qualify as issuer paid.262 If there were a conflict of interest, as defined
by Rule 17g-5, QNRSROs would be obligated to post all the data on a
website for other NRSROs to view. 263 If the 17g-5 disclosures were
affected, this would prevent, or at least severely compromise, NRSROs’
ability to issue unsolicited ratings in the field of structured financial
products.264
The 15E(w) Amendment focuses on structured finance products, as
they represent a major source of rate shopping and conflict of interest.265
Senators Franken and Wicker, assume that the new system will
successfully accomplish four goals: (1) reducing the conflict of interest,
(2) eliminating rate shopping for initial ratings, (3) rewarding accuracy,
and (4) promoting competition.266 While it seems to resolve the issues at
the heart of the most recent financial crisis, it offers no solution to the
Enron scandal, which did not involve structured products.267 It also does
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id. (“The Franken-Wicker amendment applies only to initial ratings, and does
not affect non-initial ratings or unsolicited ratings.”). However, unsolicited ratings
operate in a free market system and restricting the market will affect NRSRO’s’
motives in providing unsolicited ratings – namely the desire to break into new markets
or industries.
261. See generally id.
262. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
263. Rule 17g-5 requires disclosure for all situations where the issuer pays for the
rating and there is no exception for assigned ratings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a) (2012).
264. See supra Part II.B (discussing the necessity of requiring disclosure of nonpublic information for complex products in order to issue unsolicited ratings).
265. Comment Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, supra note 259, at
5.
266. Id. at 3.
267. See supra Part I.A.1.
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not address rate shopping of corporate bond issuers. 268 It simply
provides a piecemeal solution to a systemic problem that extends to
every rated security and does so by interfering with the free market.269
Overall, this amendment creates a scenario that prevents a repeat of the
2008 problem but does not necessarily set up a system where other
future rating problems will be prevented.270
This proposal does eliminate market competition and selfregulation through unsolicited ratings via Rule 17g-5 and the reputation
theory. 271 As commentators adamantly stressed, this is an extreme
step.272 This Note advocates for a scheme where unsolicited ratings are
accurate and beneficial to the social welfare, in such a way that the SEC
can encourage its practice without fearing abuse by NRSROs. 273
Additionally, the narrow application of the reputation theory to improve
the state of unsolicited ratings demonstrates that it can be workable.
C. ADDITIONAL USEFUL REGULATIONS
Both the Credit Reform Act and Dodd-Frank took strident steps
toward a more transparent credit rating procedure.274 Slight adjustments
are possible to reach the Inequality and increase the value of an
NRSRO’s reputation. Form NRSRO requires disclosure of transition
and default rates for three periods according to the ratings’ classes.275
268.
269.
270.

See supra Part I.B.1.
See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study , supra note 148, at 48–51.
Another commentator has pointed that the 15E(w) Amendment is necessary
because of the potential for NRSRO nullification. This is so because compliance is
costly, yet the benefits of being an NRSRO have been reduced through the purging of
NRSRO’s from federal statutes. Parsont, supra note 247, at 1020. By creating the
QNRSRO pool, the Board would establish another elite club of raters with benefits that
would entice NRSROs to comply with the more extensive regulations of the SEC and
the Board.. Id. Without this elite club, NRSROs might simply exit (stop registering with
the SEC). Id. While this worry seems reasonable, it is highly speculative and downplays
the solution of simply changing the law to make NRSRO registration necessary.
271. The 15E(w) Amendment creates a semi-closed market economy. Comment
Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, supra note 259, at 3–4.
272. See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra note 148, at 21, 30–52
(commentators arguing that existing provisions of Dodd-Frank would be enough to
address the conflict of interest without the deeply flawed 15E(w) Amendment).
273. The changes required to encourage greater use of 17g-5 disclosures are outside
the scope of this Note. For different solutions, see the letters submitted in response to
the Solicitation of Comment, supra note 147 and accompanying text.
274. See supra Section III.B.
275. See Form NRSRO, supra note 111.
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This produces about 75–85 pages of matrices that a typical investor
would probably not read.276 Ineffective disclosures serve no purpose,
and buried disclosures are no disclosures at all. NRSROs need to
provide information that is simple to understand and is not buried under
eighty pages of statistics.277 The SEC adopted rules to make disclosures
in an S-1 application effective, so it is reasonable to require the same
thing for NRSRO reports, namely through a summary of important
information in the beginning.278 The SEC has already recognized the
need for standard, easy-to-follow matrices and has proposed changes to
that effect. 279 However, the SEC still has not finalized rules or
implemented those changes.280
The second alteration would be to highlight the risks and problems
in the beginning of Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO to inform an investor of
the possible deficiencies. In a S-1, the issuer is required to list the risk
factors right after the summary section.281 NRSROs should be required
to do the same with their performance statistics and describe any
problems or anomalies with the data. 282 For example, part of the
summary disclosure section can include the following hypothetical
statement: “The default rates for asset back securities for the terms of
one, three, and ten years have been higher than predicted by their
ratings. The elevation can be traced back to the 2008 Financial
Crisis.”283 These disclosures will draw the investor’s attention to any

276. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM NRSRO
2011, supra note 201, at 71 ex.1; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, STANDARD &
POOR’S FORM NRSRO: EXHIBIT 1, supra note 222.
277. The problem was already recognized in Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76
Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,435 (proposed May 18, 2011).
278. See Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1),
available at www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf (current through Oct. 31, 2014).
279. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,435; see also supra note 131 and accompanying
matrix.
280. SEC Proposed Rules: 2011, supra note 130.
281. Form S-1, supra note 278.
282. The SEC requires that S-1 disclosures provide a “discussion of the most
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c)
(2012).
283. Though provided hypothetically, the data from S&P and Moody’s does confirm
the statement. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM
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significant inaccuracies. 284 The annual certifications should provide
information specifically addressing the performance of unsolicited
ratings, which would both differentiate solicited from unsolicited
ratings, as well as make it easier to spot any misuses of unsolicited
ratings. Given the abundance of the charts already included in Exhibit
1, the additional cost of compliance for inserting tables addressing
unsolicited ratings should not be prohibitively high. Furthermore, the
inclusion of the additional information would not just be beneficial for a
better assessment of an NRSRO’s reputation; it would also encourage
unsolicited ratings of structured financial products, a critical purpose of
Rule 17g-5.285 The addition of the unsolicited ratings matrices would
provide investors with the necessary performance and efficiency data to
evaluate the effectiveness of the equal access rule.286
CONCLUSION
Fulghieri and his colleagues address the confusion surrounding
unsolicited ratings by forming the Inequality, which analyzes
reputational effects and other profit making motives.287 The short-term
gains of threats to the issuer are balanced against the long-term
reputational costs of the rating agency. As long as the long-term
reputational costs are higher than the short-term gains, CRAs will issue
accurate ratings, which in turn benefits society.288 The benefits to the
market can also be increased by making CRAs more transparent and by
bringing the costs closer to the present.289 First, the more transparent the
process, the easier it is for an investor to judge their accuracy and
reputation.290 It would also be possible for other CRAs to use the indepth information to act as a check on the solicited rating,291 something
which would encourage and enable competition and self-regulation
NRSRO 2011, supra note 201, at 71 ex.1; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES,
STANDARD & POOR’S FORM NRSRO: EXHIBIT 1, supra note 222.
284. Just as the S-1 disclosures would provide any significant factors that make the
security risky. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2012).
285. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov.
23, 2009).
286. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b) (2012).
287. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.
288. Id.
289. See supra Part III.A.
290. See supra Part III.B.1.
291. See Xia & Strobl, supra note 252.
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within the industry.292 Conveniently, the Credit Reform Act grants the
SEC the power to regulate the required disclosure of methodologies.293
The other approach to highlighting a CRA’s reputation is to make the
reputation effects more tangible in the foreseeable future. Since in the
Inequality, the reputational effects are long-term, their long-term
costs/gains have to be discounted to present value.294 If the realization
of the reputation cost is sooner rather than later, the discounting for the
firm would be less and the reputational worth would be higher.
Alternatively, regulators can attempt to decrease the short-term profits
from misuse of unsolicited rating by a standard industry wide fee
system, thereby focusing on the increased fee motivation.295
Dodd-Frank disclosure reforms greatly further the road to accurate
unsolicited ratings296 by making NRSROs provide extensive reports of
their methodologies, assumptions, due diligence, and data for every
rating.297 This would allow investors and other NRSROs to better judge
the accuracy of a particular rating, and make it easier to provide and
justify an unsolicited rating for the same security. 298 By providing
unsolicited rating, competing NRSROs can both increase their
reputation by producing better models, as well as criticize the models
and core assumptions of the solicited NRSRO. 299 Ultimately, this
competition will benefit both the agencies and the investors by
providing more accurate ratings overall and increasing the name and
goodwill of previously small or unknown CRAs.300

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Bai, supra note 109, at 51.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006).
34 C.F.R. § 668.28(b) (2012).
See supra Part III.B.2.
The potential downside is the increased regulatory expense of producing an
unsolicited rating that may dissuade NRSROs from actually publishing their rating.
297. Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1880–81.
298. Cf. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov.
23, 2009) (greater disclosure would allow for unsolicited ratings and more accurate
ratings).
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. When the terms of the Inequality are fulfilled, unsolicited ratings will create a
more stringent rating standard. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.

